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ABSTRACT 
Application of a Heuristic Method to a Water Distribution System for Determining 
Optimal Water Quality Monitoring Locations 
Lawrence David Johnson 
Although regulations and requirements for water quality source monitoring have 
increased, drinking water distribution systems can still be considered vulnerable to 
purposeful or accidental contamination. 
This study analyzes the transport of the hypothetical contaminant 
Cryptosporidium through the distribution system of a city with a population of 30,000 to 
50,000 in an attempt to locate the optimal monitoring locations in the distribution system. 
Cryptosporidium was selected due to its resistance to chlorine and it’s conservative 
properties for vulnerability assessments. The method for selecting the optimal monitoring 
locations was taken from Chastain (2004) which developed and examined the method for 
a virtual city. However, Chastain did not apply the method to an actual city. This study 
looks to use Chastain’s method conjunctively with WaterCAD® and Excel in an attempt 
to accommodate to the small scale systems which are more vulnerable relatively 
speaking. 
The results of the analysis, shown in Appendices A and B, are grouped into zones 
of significance which contain a cluster of optimal points for placing water quality 
sensors. These zones of significance are to be taken as a guide for mitigating potential 
terrorist initiated events on the water distribution system.
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CHAPTER I: PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, have led to a heightened 
security awareness regarding our nation’s vital resources, including water infrastructure. 
In particular, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 of 2003 and the 
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 fostered expanding awareness of the vulnerability 
of water infrastructure. Although water quality monitoring in the US is intensive at the 
influent and effluent points of drinking water treatment plants, the water distribution 
systems often lack water quality monitoring. This lack of information from the 
distribution systems is compounded by the inherent vulnerability of distribution systems, 
which range over wide areas and are difficult to harden against mischief. To improve 
water quality monitoring and monitoring efficiency, optimal locations for monitoring 
stations within water distribution systems need to be identified.  
1.1 Other Methods 
Chastain (2004) discusses methodologies to identify the optimal monitoring 
locations in a water distribution system. These methods are sparse and often rely on the 
assumption that the contamination event is steady and continuous which would not reflect 
a possible terrorist activated contamination correctly. Kessler, Ostfeld & Sinai (1998) 
propose a method focused on contaminant advection. Their method, however, assumes a 
steady release of contaminant and selects contaminants which are not conservative. 
Chastain (2004) argues these methods have seen little application due to the complexity 
of their algorithms and the varying assumptions required to carry out these detailed 
processes. These methods also do not use the extended period simulation models that are 
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now available, which provide a better depiction of system hydraulics and water 
movement to real world data (Chastain 2004). 
Commercially available software has been developed that attempts to identify the 
optimal water quality monitoring locations. The Threat Ensemble Vulnerability 
Assessment and Sensor Placement Optimization Tool (TEVA-SPOT) is a free program 
which was recently developed by the USEPA. It uses a graphical user interface that will 
also integrate with the EPANET software in terms of the hydraulic analysis portion of the 
optimal sensor placement algorithms. But this software also uses the assumption of a 
continuous injection of a contaminant, which is not likely to be indicative of a terrorist 
contamination. The processing time also increases with the increasing size of the water 
distribution system, and can make it rather expensive and time dependent to apply the 
generic optimization algorithms. It can however, serve as a good starting point for 
distribution systems managers given that both the hydraulic software and the 
optimization software are both available free from the USEPA. 
One reason that optimization research has been minimal is the sensitivity of 
information on distribution systems, post 9/11, make it difficult for academic researchers 
to obtain real distribution systems maps and models. As experienced in the present thesis 
research, many water utility operators are hesitant to release data on the geophysical 
properties of their water delivery systems as precaution against inadvertently aiding 
system attackers. One solution to this concern is the creation and use of virtual cities 
(Brumbelow et al. 2007) which provides a practical, publicly-available model that can be 
used for various research analyses.   
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For the research conducted in this paper, a real system was used from a California 
city which serves a community of 30,000 to 50,000 residents. For simplicity, the 
California city will be referred to as “the CITY” in this thesis. The geophysical properties 
and name of this system will remain anonymous as requested by the CITY. 
The process by which the optimal operating points will be identified will begin 
with first assessing the model given by the CITY and calibrating it, if required, to more 
accurately represent the hydraulics of the city’s water distribution system (WDS). A 
constituent analysis will then be performed under various scenarios which are outlined in 
the later sections of this thesis. The results of this constituent analysis will then be 
imported into an Excel spreadsheet in order to determine which nodes detected the 
highest number of contaminations over a selected duration of time. The node with the 
highest number of detections would be considered the most efficient node for a particular 
scenario. Summary tables and figures will be provided, outlining and explaining the 
resulting trends from the analysis. One of the overall objectives of this research is to 
maintain simplicity in order to make the process and method more accessible for small to 
mid-sized water distribution systems operators. The method proposed also would be 
applicable to a larger distribution system.  
The following chapters begin with first identifying the typical components of a 
water distribution system and the vulnerability of their components to attack, whether 
from natural phenomenon or terrorist activity. The contaminants of interest are explored 
next in order to determine types of contaminants better suited for vulnerability 
assessments. These sections are followed by the selected assumptions, calibration of the 
model, and outline of the various scenarios that are used in the analysis. Next, the 
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constituent analyses are described in detail, followed by the data processing procedures 
performed in excel. The results are displayed graphically in order to qualitatively identify 
the zones of significance where optimal nodes are frequently identified. The final chapter 
then explores various recommendations for future work based on this study.
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CHAPTER II: WATER SYSTEM VULNERABILITY 
Mitigating all vulnerabilities in a system is impractical. However, systems might 
be hardened to a point that is both effective and affordable. The degree of hardening will 
depend on the current system conditions as well as the inherent resilience of the system.  
2.1 Resilience 
Resilience is, “…the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and still retain its 
basic function and structure” (Walker & Salt 2006), and this important concept applies to 
water distribution systems, as it is a good indicator of the overall vulnerability of the 
system.  
2.2 Hardening 
Finding optimal water quality locations is one way operators of a WDS can 
harden the water distribution system overall. Water system hardening has increased in the 
past twenty years likely from technological advancements, increased understanding of 
systems and through legislative requirements, among other factors. In addition, the 
wastewater and drinking water infrastructures are in extremely poor condition overall 
(ASCE 2009). Many of these piping systems have been in the ground for over 50 years, 
are highly degraded, and are in need of replacement. ASCE estimated that it would cost 
approximately $255 billion to repair the degraded water infrastructure over the next five 
years. US investment is projected to fall short of this number by approximately $110 
billion. Since funding is an issue for most major cities and districts, many are fixing the 
sewer and drinking water lines piecemeal when failure occurs. This means that most 
cities are operating within the factor of safety for which the pipelines were designed. This 
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could pose major adverse health and environmental concerns in the future if wastewater 
is allowed to leach on a consistent basis. This shows how the distribution system is 
already in a vulnerable state and any hardening associated projects will propel the system 
to be safer from a variety of threats.  
2.3 Water Distribution System Components 
In order to assess the vulnerable aspects of a water system, we must first identify 
the components of the WDS. A public water system is defined as a system with at least 
15 connections or serving at least 25 people for a period of at least 60 days (Deininger 
2000). A typical WDS consists of a water source, a treatment system for that water 
source, and a transmission and distribution system that transports the treated water to the 
users of the system. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Basic components of a water utility infrastructure (Cullinane 1989) 
7 
 
2.3.1 Water Supply 
Water supplies can be generalized in one of four categories: groundwater, surface 
water, groundwater under the direct influence of surface water, and brackish water. Each 
source water type would present different advantages and disadvantages in regards to 
contamination entry points into a water distribution system. The following sections 
describe each source water type. 
2.3.1.1 Groundwater 
Groundwater sources can be unconfined aquifers, confined aquifers, perched 
aquifers as well as combinations of these. Unconfined aquifers allow for natural 
groundwater recharge as the aquifer is directly connected with the surface soil strata. 
Confined aquifers would allow little natural recharge, thus requiring an artificial recharge 
such as pumping directly into the confined aquifer.  
Groundwater is usually preferable to surface water for a number of factors. 
Groundwater provides a natural water filter through the process of infiltration for 
groundwater recharge. Hence, groundwater can be used with little or no treatment. It also 
serves as a natural storage mechanism with more consistent volumetric yield levels 
(Chastain 2004).  
2.3.1.2 Surface Water 
Surface water can include rivers, lakes and reservoirs which collect and transport 
storm and snow runoff. Due to the nature of the collection of surface water, the water 
quality can often fluctuate depending on various factors as the runoff travels over the 
watershed. The Surface Water Treatment Rule from the USEPA sets the regulations and 
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requirements for monitoring and the removal of contaminants through disinfection as 
discussed in 2.6.1. 
2.3.1.3 Groundwater under Direct Influence of Surface Water 
The USEPA has recently issued the Long Term 2 Enhanced Surface Water 
Treatment Rule that requires the communities using groundwater under the direct 
influence of surface water to disinfect for the parasitic protozoan Cryptosporidium. This 
type of source water generally includes a system by which surface water is diverted into 
ponds where the water can then percolate through the soil into the groundwater for 
recharge. The water is then pumped from the groundwater, treated and distributed to the 
community for use.  
2.3.1.4 Brackish Water 
This water source may refer to the mixing of seawater and freshwater, as in 
estuaries. This is much less common than the other water sources as it requires a close 
proximity to the ocean and is significantly more expensive. As the technology improves, 
a shift may occur to the use of more desalination plants in order to remove the salt from 
the supply. However, this lack in advancement has been the limiting factor for most 
coastal communities. Coastal communities must also be aware of salt water intrusion into 
the underground aquifers. This could compromise the water source and require additional 
means to either treat for the intrusion or to prevent brackish water from intruding using 
various preventive methods. 
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2.3.2 Treatment Plant 
Treatment of source water is now required for all water distribution systems based 
on the progression of the regulations by the USEPA.  Each treatment system varies based 
on the source water conditions and the system needs. If the source water, or other 
conjunctive water sources, contains high quality water, then the simplest form of water 
treatment would consist of chlorine disinfection. Other added layers of treatment could 
include a pH adjustment, filtration systems, chlorine dioxide disinfection, ozone 
disinfection, ultraviolet disinfection etc.  
2.3.3 Distribution Network 
The distribution system consists of the pipes, pumps, tanks and other 
appurtenances that distribute the treated water to the users of the system. The distribution 
network is generally comprised of looped piping systems in order to provide redundancy 
to the system. A minimum system pressure is also an indication of redundancy and 
reliability. 
 
 
Figure 2: Hierarchical relationship of system, components, subcomponents, sub-
subcomponents for a water distribution system (Cullinane 1989) 
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2.4 Vulnerability Categories 
With the basic water system components identified we can begin to look at the 
various vulnerabilities and threats associated with them. Haimes et al. (1998) describes 
the various vulnerability categories in regards to WDS. They are summarized as follows: 
Physical Threats: Includes any physical damage to the infrastructure of a water system, 
i.e. dams, tanks, pipes, valves, treatment facilities, canals, aqueducts, etc., due to natural 
calamities or intentional attacks. 
Chemical and Biological Threats: Includes any contamination of the system water, 
whether intentional or unintentional. This can include source water contamination, 
reservoir contamination, groundwater contamination or contamination directly into the 
distribution or transmission system. 
Cyber Threats: Includes any attacks on the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems, which control the various operations and monitoring of the system. 
For this study, we will focus on the biological threat aspect as it pertains to directly 
contaminating the distribution system through intentional means. 
2.5 Points of Contamination 
Chemical or biological agents must have an entry point into the water distribution 
system in order for contamination to occur. Possible entry points are outlined next and 
briefly discussed. 
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2.5.1 Water Treatment Plant 
Almost 19% of community water systems are fed by surface water sources 
(Deininger et. al. 2000). The other 81% are fed by groundwater sources, which in most 
cases for sustained groundwater use is directly influenced by surface water infiltration in 
order to recharge the groundwater levels during periods of low water use. Therefore, a 
majority of the source water hinges on surface water protection. Since surface water is 
open to the environment, it is an easily accessible point of contamination for those 
looking to intentionally compromise a community’s water supply. Even through source 
water contamination, it will not necessarily follow that a community’s water system will 
be compromised. This is due to the treatment and monitoring that are required by the 
USEPA regulations. Due to these water quality requirements, outlined in section 2.6, 
source water contamination would likely be identified, treated for, and initiate shutdown 
of service if it cannot be readily eradicated from the system. 
2.5.2 Pump Stations and Valves 
Most pump stations are protected from intrusion by the pump housings as well as 
locked buildings which contain them. Valves should also have similar means of 
protection. If accessed however, an improper shutdown of a pump or valve could 
potentially cause severe water hammer or cavitation effects in other areas of the system.  
2.5.3 Tanks and Reservoirs 
Tanks and reservoirs are the main focus for this research due to their easier 
accessibility. These hydraulic structures are a target of concern as they are usually 
secluded with limited security. Most importantly, these structures have a direct influence 
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on the system hydraulics and provide a quick means of contaminating a large portion of a 
system in a short amount of time. 
2.5.4 Hydrants 
A possible scenario for contamination could include pumping into the distribution 
system through a hydrant. This would require a portable tank as well as a pump and 
motor assembly with enough total dynamic head to counter the outgoing pressure of the 
distribution lines. This scenario would pose a risk for anyone attempting to contaminate 
due to the high exposure probability. Hydrants are generally located in highly populated 
areas in order to efficiently provide fire safety to the buildings nearby. This is 
compounded by the fact that the pump and motor assembly would cause a significant 
amount of noise, which would likely be heard by the nearby residents. 
2.6 Redundancy  
All water systems should have planned redundancies to improve the likelihood of 
continued performance during unforeseen periods of disturbance. These disturbances can 
be anything from an electrical failure, power outage, pump replacement, motor failure, 
maintenance, etc. Redundancy is often achieved by providing multiples of the vital 
components in the system, i.e. a second pumping system parallel to the normally 
operating pumping system, or backup generators in case of power outages. This insures 
that the system will still function, possibly with a decreased level of service, when a 
disturbance occurs.  
Another means of redundancy is provided through the pipe network design of the 
water distribution system. Looped networks are more favorable than non-looped 
 networks due to the added level of reliability. In the case of a pipe break, a looped system 
would be able to redirect flow to
would. This is illustrated in 
As can be observed in the 
without service during the pipe break 
provides service to the majority of the users during
2.6.1 System Residual 
One means that most systems use to gauge the safety 
in the distribution phase is through the concept of a system residual. A system residual is 
measured through water quality testing and s
disinfectant, in most cases this is a chlorine concentration, is maintained in the system 
from the source to the end point. This provides 
Figure 3: Looped and branched systems after failure. (Walski et al. (2007)
 a greater number of customers than branched system 
figure 3 where a pipe break scenario is shown. 
schematic, the lower portion of the branched network is 
scenario whereas the looped network design still 
 the same event. 
and the quality of the water 
hows that a minimum concentration of 
confirmation to the USEPA
13 
 that the 
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system is meeting disinfection requirements and regulations throughout the system. 
However, microbial contaminants such as Cryptosporidium and Giardia have shown a 
resistance to the chlorine residual, making it possible for a system to have the USEPA 
required chlorine residual but still not meet water quality requirements. In recent years 
this has become a main concern, especially after the case study of the Cryptosporidium 
outbreak in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1993 where approximately 400,000 people became 
ill because of the contamination (Corso et al. 2003).  
2.7 Water Quality Regulation 
This section outlines the implemented regulations by the USEPA and illustrates 
the progression of drinking water safety in regards to water distribution rules and 
regulations. These regulations require various degrees of disinfection which can be met 
by a variety of methods. Common disinfection methods include chlorine, ozone, chlorine 
dioxide, ultraviolet, filtration, etc. The type and scale of the method of disinfection 
depends on the system needs and the source water quality which are unique for each case. 
2.7.1 Surface Water Treatment Rule  
Brought on by the passage of the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1979 that provided 
the authorization to the USEPA for regulating drinking water quality, the Surface Water 
Treatment Rule (SWTR) of 1989 requires water systems to remove contaminants from 
source water through some means of filtration or disinfection. This rule also provides the 
maximum contaminant levels (MCL) and maximum contaminant level goals (MCLG) of 
various critical contaminants. The contaminants include various microbial contaminants 
and viruses which pose the most threat to serious illness of the user if exposure were to 
occur (USEPA, 2011a). 
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The SWTR also stipulated contaminant removal requirements specified by a log 
removal value. These values are summarized below in tabular format. 
Table 1: Log removal values as expressed in contaminant removal percentages 
(USEPA 2011a). 
 
 
 
Contaminants were issued various log removal requirements based on the MCL specified 
by the USEPA. Water systems must achieve a 3-log removal of giardia, and a 4-log 
removal of viruses. These values depend on the nature of the contaminant and its 
associated risk to human health. In order to ensure these regulations were being followed, 
the USEPA requires these contaminant levels to be measured via turbidity and by 
maintaining a system residual of disinfection throughout distribution. Cryptosporidium 
has posed a particular problem for operators due to its resistance toward chlorine 
disinfection, which is the most common form of residual disinfection for water 
distribution. 
2.7.2 Interim Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule 
Following the SWTR, the Interim Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule 
(IESWTR) was passed in 1998. This requires water systems which provide water for at 
least 10,000 users to improve filtration and lower turbidity at the end point.  
2.7.3 Long Term 1 Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule 
The Long Term 1 Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule (LT2ESWTR) expanded 
Log Removal Number Percentage of Contaminant Required to be Removed 
2-Log 99% 
3-Log 99.9% 
4-Log 99.99% 
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upon the IESWTR by including systems that serve fewer than 10,000 people to the 
requirements of the IESWTR. Enforcement of this rule began in 2002. 
2.7.4 Long Term 2 Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule 
On August 11, 2003 the USEPA proposed the Long Term 2 Enhanced Surface 
Water Treatment Rule (LT2ESWTR). This rule affects any water distribution systems 
that serve to a community with source water stemming from either surface water or 
groundwater under the direct influence (GWUDI) of surface water. The rule directly 
relates to the contamination of water systems with Cryptosporidium. This has become a 
concern for water providers due to the resistance of Cryptosporidium to chlorine residuals 
and other disinfectants. If consumed, Cryptosporidium can cause gastrointestinal illness 
and in the cases of individuals with weakened immune systems, can be fatal. 
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CHAPTER III: CONTAMINANTS AND MONITORING CAPABILITIES 
3.1 Ideal Contaminant 
One of the key questions to be answered for any vulnerability assessment, in 
regards to contamination analysis, is which contaminant to model.  Franke (1977) lists 
factors that should be considered in the evaluation of an “ideal” biological or chemical 
contaminant from a terrorist perspective: 
• High Toxicity 
• No Taste or odor 
• Chemical and physical stability 
• Delayed action to protect the sabotage agent 
• Difficult recognition of poisoning, no specific pathologic changes in the organism 
• Difficulties with the detection of the poison with normal analytical methods 
• Unusual effect of poisons, no known antidotes 
The availability of a particular agent is important to consider in terms of selecting 
the “ideal” contaminant. Ease of access and transportation of the contaminant may 
correlate with the amount of risk associated with a particular agent. In addition, the 
mechanism by which a particular contaminant is to be introduced into the distribution 
system should be considered. These factors will change depending on the point of 
injection, level of security at that point and the effect using that point will have on the 
system. Thus, quantifying risk in regards to contaminant selection is rather difficult as a 
number of factors must be considered simultaneously. One way to quantify risk is 
through the LD50 value associated with a particular contaminant. LD50 (or Lethal Dose 
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50) is the amount of contaminant needed to cause fatalities in 50% of the sample 
population. Table 2 illustrates LD50 values for various substances. The lower the LD50 
value, the more toxic the substance. 
Table 2: Comparative Toxicity of Natural Poisons (Deininger 2000). 
Substance LD50 in ug/kg (mouse) 
Botulinus 0.00003 
Tetanus 0.001 
Tetrodotoxin 9 
Saxitoxin 9 
Batrachotoxin 2.7 
Palytoxin 0.15 
Terrorist would likely choose contaminants with low LD50 values in an attempt to harm 
as many people as possible. In addition to low LD50 values, terrorists would need to 
consider the possibility of inactivation of the pathogen due to the chlorine residual in the 
distribution network. 
 The present system residual is a reason why the tolerance to chlorine is another 
important factor to consider due to a vast majority of water distribution systems using 
chlorine residuals to disinfect. This eliminates many contaminants with far more risk 
associated with them, such as Botulinus Toxin A, because of the ability of the chlorine 
residual to disinfect most toxins (Deininger 2000). 
A comprehensive list of all of the contaminants of concern which can be found on 
the USEPA’s website (USEPA, 2009b). This list breaks down that contaminants into 
several categories based on pathogen type (i.e. biological, by-product, microorganism, 
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organic chemical, etc.) The list also contains information on the MCL’s, MCLG’s, 
potential health effects, and common sources for each contaminant.  
3.2 Decay Rates 
 The rate of decay of a contaminant is an important property which must be 
considered conservatively in contaminant vulnerability assessments. If a contaminant 
does degrade or decay at a significant rate, it should be modeled accordingly in the 
vulnerability analysis. However, it is recommended that conservative, non-decaying 
contaminants be chosen for modeling due to the desired conservative nature of the 
assessment (Haested Methods, 2007).  In this case, the system would have an analysis for 
which no decay is observed. A second analysis could then be performed to identify the 
sensitivity, if any, of a change in concentration.  
3.3 Monitoring Thresholds 
The USEPA provides research into sensor technologies that detect anomalous 
changes in the baseline water quality (USEPA, 2009a). This is due to the need for water 
quality monitoring to be both economically viable for mass implementation in a water 
system and to sense many different types of contaminants. These sensors therefore do not 
focus on identifying the type of contaminant, concentration amount, accuracy or 
precision of the contaminant in question. Instead, the sensor detects the deviation from 
baseline water quality and then alerts the water utility. Following this alert, further 
sampling and analysis would then be required to determine the exact extent of the 
contamination event in both quantity and quality. This continuous monitoring of the 
baseline water quality will also provide secondary benefits in a water distribution system. 
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A minimum threshold change was also needed for the USEPA study, in order to 
verify that a change in the baseline water quality could be detected even at the small 
MCL levels that are required by the USEPA regulation. It was found that contaminant 
concentrations of 1.0 mg/L were typical for both injection method tests. This 
concentration was detectable by at least one of the monitoring sensors in the test. This 1.0 
mg/L value is far below most Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) values as 
specified by the USEPA for most contaminants. It was also tested and confirmed that the 
act of injecting the contaminant during testing did not alter the results or affect baseline 
water quality values.
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CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Contaminant/Agent Selection 
The contaminant that was selected for application to the CITY was 
Cryptosporidium. Cryptosporidium is a single celled parasite that is commonly found in 
rivers and lakes, especially when raw sewage or animal fecal material is being discharged 
into the water source. Cryptosporidium oocysts are highly resistant to chlorine residuals, 
and they are notoriously difficult to disinfect. This resistance is due to the outer shell that 
accompanies the oocyst, allowing it to survive for long periods of time outside of a host 
body. Cryptosporidium is one of the most common waterborne diseases among humans 
in the United States (CDC 2011). This may make Cryptosporidium a contaminant of 
choice for terrorists as the vast majority of distribution systems would be vulnerable to its 
introduction. The use of Cryptosporidium as a weapon can seem counterintuitive due to 
the fact that many other contaminants, such as Botulinus Toxin A, are considered to be of 
a much higher risk and therefore have much lower Lethal Dose (LD50) values. However, 
these types of contaminants are eliminated with a properly maintained chlorine residual 
in the distribution system. 
4.2 Constituent Properties 
With the selection of Cryptosporidium as the contaminant of concern for this 
research came a need to select a decay rate for the constituent properties section of the 
WaterCAD® analysis. A bulk reaction rate of zero, indicating no decay occurs, was 
selected for the decay rate due to literature indicating that the decay rate for a 1-log 
removal of the pathogen would take approximately 39 days (Toze et al. 2010). Since the 
extended period simulation (EPS) for this study was only 24 hours, this would constitute 
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less than a 3% decay of the pathogen. Considering this decay negligible also made the 
analysis more conservative, as it assumes that the contaminant moves primarily by 
advection through the system and does not degrade. Any additional decay would simply 
lessen the spread extent that was found in this analysis. Use of conservative constituent 
analysis is usually recommended for vulnerability assessments based on Haested 
Methods (2007). The contaminant therefore will only change concentration due to either 
dilution or with the contaminant being removed from the system via daily demand 
patterns. When the contaminant is removed from the system by the user it is assumed that 
the primary means of acquiring the contaminant will be through ingestion of the 
contaminated water. 
4.3 Release Type 
The release was assumed to be a quantity of 300,000 mg/L at a rate of 50gpm for 
one hour. An assumption is being made for the concentration units where 1 oocyst/L is 
equivalent to 1 mg/L for modeling purposes. These values were chosen based on the 
assumptions of Chastain (2004). These properties were then applied to each tank in the 
contamination analysis in WaterCAD® through the use of a flow paced booster in the 
contamination alternatives manager. 
4.3.1 Flow Paced Booster 
The flow paced booster involves raising the concentration of the fluid by a fixed quantity 
even through flow changes.  This is used to model flow driven constituent movement 
throughout the system. It is given by the following equation: 
  
∑
∑
 	 {1} 
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 Where:  C0 = Concentration at and out of node (M/L3) 
  Cf = Increase in concentration at node (M/L3) 
 Ci = Concentration of the i-th inflow node into 
the node (M/L3) 
  Qi = Flow from i-th inflow into node (L3/T) 
Using the above equation, WaterCAD® adds a set concentration of a constituent after 
mixing of all inflow to the node from other points in the network. 
4.4 Release Location 
An intentional contamination release could occur at any potential opening in the 
system as outlined in section 2.4. It was assumed for the purpose of this analysis that the 
most likely point of contamination would be through the tanks of the system. This is due 
to the ease of accessibility of most water distribution tanks compared to that of pumping 
system connections. The release location inherently needed to be downstream of the 
source water and treatment plant in order to examine the effects on the distribution 
system alone. Hydrants are considered a low priority of interest due to the possibility of 
using portable tanks and pump and motor assemblies to pump the contaminant into a 
hydrant against the pressure of the system. This was determined to be too risky for those 
looking to intentionally compromise a system due to the highly exposed nature of hydrant 
locations. This high potential for exposure would be due to the noise of the pump and 
motor assembly, which would be required to run for at least an hour for this analysis.  
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4.5 Pipe Mixing Theory 
The main transport mechanism of the constituent through the system is assumed 
to be through advection. With this assumption the contaminant will travel through a pipe 
at the same average velocity as the fluid within the pipe while simultaneously reacting at 
a given rate if the contaminant decays or grows.  Longitudinal dispersion is assumed to 
not be a significant means of contaminant transport through the pipe under most 
operating conditions. Advection in the pipe is given in WaterCAD® by the following 
equation: 
 



  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   {2} 
 Where: Ci  = Concentration (mass/volume) in pipe i 
   ui  = Flow Velocity (length/time) in pipe i 
r = Rate of reaction (mass/volume/time) as a function  
   of concentration 
t = Time 
x = Longitudinal distance in pipe 
 
4.6 Storage Mixing Theory 
The storage facilities (i.e. tanks and reservoirs) are assumed to have completely 
mixed contents. Given that a minimum momentum flux is imparted to the inflow and that 
the conditions of the tank correspond with fill and draw techniques, then this is a 
reasonable assumption (Rossman and Grayman, 1999). Concentrations could change 
however, due to various reactions within the tank.  The following equation expresses the 
storage mixing in WaterCAD®: 
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 Where: Vs = Volume in storage at time t 
  Cs = Concentration within the storage facility 
  Is = Set of links providing flow into the facility 
  Os = Set of links withdrawing flow from the  
    facility  
  Qj = Flow (Volume/Time) in link j 
  Qi = Flow (Volume/Time) in link i 
 
4.7 Junction Mixing Theory 
Mixing of inflow from two or more pipes is assumed to be completely 
instantaneous. Therefore the flow concentration is a weighted average of the inflow pipe 
flow concentrations. For any node k, the concentration can be found by the following 
equation: 
 |! 
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 Where: I = Link with flow leaving node k 
  Ik = Set of links with flow into k 
  Lj = Length of link j 
  Qj = Flow (volume/time) in link j 
  Qk,ext = External source flow entering the 
    network at node k 
  Ck,ext = Concentration of the external flow  
    entering at node k 
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  Ci|x=0 = The concentration at the start of link i 
  Ci|x=L = The concentration at the end of link i  
  ε = Roughness Height (m, ft.) 
 
Equations {2-4} are subject to the following assumptions made by WaterCAD® in order 
to solve for the concentration in each pipe as well as the concentration in each storage 
structure: 
• Initial conditions that specify Ci for all x in each pipe i and Cs in each storage 
facility s at time 0. 
• Boundary conditions that specify values for Ck,ext and Qk,ext for all time t at each 
node k which has external mass inputs. 
• Hydraulic conditions which specify the volume Vs in each storage facility s and 
the flow Qi in each link i at all times t. 
WaterCAD® uses a Lagranian Transport Algorithm to track each discrete parcel of water. 
The algorithm uses relatively short time steps to accommodate for the short times of 
travel within the pipes. 
4.8 Number of Optimal Sensors 
The number of optimal sensor is assumed to be less than the number of tanks (i.e. 
less than seven). This is assumed due to the fact that if seven sensors were economically 
viable, than the optimal locations for those seven sensors would be at the closest nodes to 
the respective tanks in order to immediately detect a contamination event as it left the 
tanks and dispersed into the system. However, this assumes that the tanks are the source 
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of the constituents in the system. If the system was compromised through another point 
of access, then these would cease to be the optimal locations for sensor placement. This 
leads back to the idea that vulnerability is a moving target. Once one aspect of the system 
is hardened, it leaves other aspects vulnerable. The decision of how many optimal sensors 
to use and their ultimate locations should be dependent on the economic viability of those 
sensors as well as the inherent differences associated with each individual water 
distribution system.  
4.9 Chosen Model Type 
Two models were provided by the CITY. Both an average day system and a 
maximum day system were provided for analysis. The maximum day system was 
selected to be the primary system for analysis for the purpose of remaining conservative. 
The main aim for this type of vulnerability assessment is to mitigate the worst attack that 
a terrorist may have on a water distribution system, which may include targeting a water 
system on a summer day during peak water use hours.  
4.10 Summarization of Optimal Sensor Location Method 
The following summarizes the method set forth by Chastain (2004). The method is 
outlined sequentially. 
1. Apply the developed Design Basis Threat (DBT) at each injection point 
and generate a matrix which includes the concentrations that each junction 
in the system detects over the complete duration of analysis. 
2. Compare all time step data from all analyses with the chosen minimum 
concentration values in order to assign each concentration a “1” if the 
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value is greater than the minimum concentration or a “0” if the value is 
below. 
3. Sum the number of times a particular node detects a contamination above 
the minimum threshold. 
4. Sort the data to find the node that had the highest number of detections 
throughout the duration. 
5. It is recommended to perform sensitivity analyses in regards to the effect 
of the initial concentration and the minimum concentration threshold.  
As Chastain describes, there is no one optimal node for any given WDS. There is 
however, a cluster of points that can be considered optimal and would serve to detect a 
wide variety of events. These clusters will be identified as the zones of significance and 
will be outlined for each scenario in the analysis. An important assumption that is made 
for this analysis is that contamination only occurs at the junction nodes and that all nodes 
have equal importance. Therefore, it is through the junction flex tables that the 
concentration matrix is developed. It is also assumed that the possible monitoring point 
locations will be at a junction node in the system.  
The method proposed by Chastain differs from other algorithms in the following ways: 
• The method uses a separate extended period simulation for each injection 
scenario. After which, all of the results are used to locate the optimal nodes. This 
is contrary to most other algorithms which use a single hydraulic analysis and 
then attempt to optimize based on that sole hydraulics analysis.  
29 
 
• This method uses the principle of superposition by combing the results from all 
analyses and for all time steps in order to rank the individual nodes of the system. 
This approach has become increasingly less burdensome due to the advancements 
in data processing, computing power, and hydraulics software. 
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CHAPTER V: CALIBRATION OF WATER DISTRIBUTION MODEL 
Once a model was obtained from the CITY an overall assessment of the model 
was then required. The CITY was using H2ONET® software which has an export feature 
to save the water distribution model as an EPANET input file. This file could then be 
imported into either EPANET or another modeling software program capable of reading 
the input file. In this case, Bentley’s WaterCAD® was used to import the EPANET input 
file. WaterCAD® was chosen due to its local availability at California Polytechnic State 
University in San Luis Obispo as well as the increased amount of modeling capabilities 
and functions. 
The tanks in the system are modeled as reservoirs within the model. Upon a 
detailed discussion with the modeler and the operations department of the CITY, the 
reason for this modeling decision was determined as based on the operation of the tanks. 
Each tank operates with an isolation valve that is opened during periods of boosting. The 
tank then releases water into the system via a pump which pressurizes the pipe 
connecting the tank to the system to the current operating pressure. In this sense, the 
tanks do not contribute to the hydraulics of the system when they are not pumping. In 
other words, during boosting hours the isolation valves are opened and the pumps are 
turned on allowing for flow to be contributed to the system from the tanks. When 
boosting hours terminate, the isolation valve closes which effectively removes the tanks 
from the rest of the WDS. Also, the tank levels do not vary much during the operation 
periods and therefore do not cause a high amount of pressure difference between when 
the tanks are filling or boosting. Thus, the tanks are modeled as reservoirs with fixed 
energy grade lines in order to mimic the flow rates and pressures that are actually 
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observed. When the tanks are not in operation, the valve is then closed in the connecting 
pipe, effectively isolating it from the system.  
Once imported into WaterCAD® the system was assessed by running a hydraulics 
analysis to verify that the distribution system was successfully imported with no errors to 
be corrected. The hydraulics analysis did yield a preliminary issue concerning tanks 1-7, 
which are of a primary concern in regards to the contamination scenarios. Upon further 
inspection it was found that the pipes connecting the tanks to the rest of the system were 
closed in the initial settings. This effectively isolated the tanks from the rest of the system 
rendering them unused in the hydraulics analysis. The operations department of the CITY 
was contacted in order to adjust the controls and the physical properties of tanks 1-7 in 
order to better mimic flow rates that were being seen in the system currently. The 
controls were set according to the data in the chart below, provided by the CITY 
operations department. 
Table 3: Booster Pump Schedule for Tanks 1-7 
Tank # Boost Days Boost Times 
1 Thursday, Sunday 5am-8am 
2 Tuesday, Saturday 5am-9am 
3 Thursday, Sunday 5am-9am 
4 Tuesday, Saturday 5am-9am 
5 Monday, Wednesday, Friday 4am-9am 
6 Monday, Wednesday, Friday 5am-4pm 
7 Monday, Wednesday, Friday 4pm-10pm 
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5.1 Adding Pump Controls to Model 
With the acquisition of the pumping schedules from the operations department of 
the CITY, the controls could now be set to mimic the boost and fill schemes as seen in 
actual operation. In the controls section of WaterCAD® under the components tab,  
logical statements can be created to let the program know when the tanks should open 
and close. An example logical statement for Tank 1 is shown in Table 4: 
Table 4: Sample WaterCAD® Control Inputs for Tank 1 
ID Type Priority Description 
LC 1848 Simple <default> If Clock Time = 5:00AM THEN P2576 Pipe Status = Open 
LC 1851 Simple <default> If Clock Time = 8:00AM THEN P2576 Pipe Status 
=Closed 
  
Table 4, shown above, illustrates the logical operators within the controls. According to 
the description, at 5:00AM the pipe status of pipe P2576 will change from closed to open. 
This will allow water to exit Tank 1 for the duration in which P2576 is open. Then, as the 
second logical control states, the pipe status of P2576 will close at 8:00AM, effectively 
isolating the tank from the rest of the system. These controls assume that the initial 
conditions of the pipes are set to closed. These logical controls are set for each tank and 
vary depending on the boost and fill times respectively. 
5.2 Adjusting Fixed Grade Elevations 
In order to adjust the flow rates of the tanks to mimic real world pumping data, the fixed 
grade elevations were adjusted until the correct outgoing flow rate was obtained.  
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Figure 4: Fixed Grade Elevation Calibration Process 
 
This was performed in a trial and error fashion, illustrated in figure 4, due to the 
hydraulic interconnectedness of the fixed grade elevations. When one fixed grade value is 
changed, multiple pumping rates also change. In order to see the changes, a hydraulic 
analysis was performed after each change in the elevation. After multiple iterations, the 
fixed grade elevations were fine tuned to reflect nearly identical flow rates from Tanks  
1-7 as observed in real life (Table 5).  
Table 5: New Fixed Grade Elevations after Calibration 
Tank # Fixed Grade Elevation (Before Calibration) 
Fixed Grade Elevation 
(After Calibration) 
1 141.00 ft 245.47 ft 
2 139.00 ft 242.96 ft 
3 142.00 ft 272.72 ft 
4 145.00 ft 276.35 ft 
5 127.25 ft 271.82 ft 
6 137.20 ft 273.29 ft 
7 110.65 ft 248.22 ft 
1. Change 
Fixed Grade 
Elevation
2. Run 
Hydraulic 
Analysis
3. Check Flow 
Rate
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CHAPTER VI: CONSTITUENT ANALYSIS 
6.1 Scenarios  
6.1.1 Scenario 1: Individual Tanks 
For the individual tank analysis the following data scenarios were input into 
WaterCAD® via the alternative and scenario managers. The analysis duration was 24 
hours. 
Table 6: Individual Tank Scenarios, Data Inputs 
Tank 
Initial 
Concentration 
(mg/L) 
Injection 
Method 
Mass Flow 
Rate (mg/s) 
Simulation 
Start Time 
1 300,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 5:00AM 
2 300,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 5:00AM 
3 300,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 5:00AM 
4 300,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 5:00AM 
5 300,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 4:00AM 
6 300,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 5:00AM 
7 300,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 4:00PM 
 
6.1.2 Scenario 2: Individual Tanks, Half of the Initial Contaminant Concentration 
This scenario was to test the sensitivity of how changing the initial concentration 
of the contaminant would affect the results for optimal sensor locations. All other inputs 
were kept the same as the previous scenario with the full concentration. The alternative 
and scenario inputs are outlined in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Individual Tanks, Half Concentration, Data inputs 
Tank 
Initial 
Concentration 
(mg/L) 
Injection 
Method 
Mass Flow 
Rate (mg/s) 
Simulation 
Start Time 
1 150,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 5:00AM 
2 150,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 5:00AM 
3 150,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 5:00AM 
4 150,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 5:00AM 
5 150,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 4:00AM 
6 150,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 5:00AM 
7 150,000 Flow Paced Booster 50 4:00PM 
 
6.1.3 Scenario 3: Tank Combinations based on boost schedules 
This scenario looks at multiple tank contamination spreads based on the tank 
operation schedule. By combining the tanks which operate on the same schedule, a 
clearer depiction of real world contamination spreads should be observed in the results. 
Based on the tank boosting schedules outlined in Chapter 5, the following tank 
combinations will be analyzed: 
• Tanks 1 and 3 
• Tanks 2 and 4 
• Tanks 5, 6 and 7 
6.1.4 Scenario 4: (All Tanks Considered) 
The last scenario looks at the absolute worst case where all tanks are 
contaminated and all are operating on the same day. This is less likely to occur in reality, 
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given that the pumping schedules are not likely to change dramatically. However, the 
results should indicate the most efficient points in the system were the pumping schemes 
to be compromised, causing a full scale contamination of each tank. 
6.2 Constituent Properties 
6.2.1 Chosen Contaminant 
As outline in Chapter IV, the chosen contaminant for analysis in the WaterCAD® 
constituent model was Cryptosporidium. This biological contaminant was chosen due to 
its resistance to chlorine disinfection. This resistance allows the Cryptosporidium oocysts 
to survive for long periods of time in chlorine disinfected systems, making them a prime 
target of choice for those attempting to intentionally contaminate a distribution system. A 
Bulk coefficient of zero was used for the constituent property. This was chosen to be 
conservative in the analysis of the constituent movement. With a bulk coefficient of zero, 
the contaminant is assumed to not decay as it moves through the system. Therefore, if the 
contaminant does decay, it will spread to a lesser extent than the analysis to be performed 
in this research.  
6.2.2 Initial concentration 
The chosen initial concentration to be released in the various scenarios considered 
is 300,000mg/L. This was determined to mimic the initial conditions that were used by 
Chastain (2004). Chastain identified that it would be possible to bring a 3,000 gallon 
tanker to a concentration of 300,000 mg/L based on Teunis et al. (2002). This study 
indicated that a culture of Cryptosporidium could be created to bring a 3,000 gallon 
tanker to a concentration of 300,000 mg/L.  The concentration was then halved for all 
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scenarios to determine its effect, if any, on the optimal monitoring point rankings and 
locations.  
This pumping rate is set at 50 gallons per minute, emptying the contents of the 
tank in 1 hour. This could yield a scenario where contamination could occur at any time 
during the night. Once the contaminant was fully discharged into the tank, it would be 
released into the system when the tank’s pumping system activated based on its pumping 
schedule which was described previously.  
6.2.3 Duration  
A 24 hour duration was selected due to the requirements set forth by the USEPA. 
The USEPA stipulates that a water utility has 24 hours to notify the users of a system 
when a contaminant is first detected. This was also the same duration that was selected by 
Chastain (2004). The chosen duration also seemed reasonable based on the preliminary 
testing of the constituent modeling processes with the various scenarios. The constituent 
properties were set to the values provided in Table 8. 
Table 8: Constituent Inputs for Cryptosporidium 
Diffusivity 1.300*10-008 ft2/s 
Unlimited Concentration? Unchecked 
Concentration Limit 300,000 mg/L 
Bulk Reaction Order 1.0 
Bulk Reaction Rate 0.000 (mg/L)^(1-n)/day 
Wall Reaction Order Zero Order 
First Order Wall Reaction Rate 0.000 ft/day 
Is Roughness Correlated Unchecked 
 Note in table 8 that the diffusivity constant was the default value given by 
WaterCAD®. Diffusion is not the main contaminant transport mechanism due to the 
advection dominated nature of the 
minimal effect on the results.
6.3 Contaminant Release
Release was only considered at the tanks of the system as they are the most likely 
target for intentional contamination. The release lo
tanks are considered operational. Once the scenarios are created, the release location can 
be set in WaterCAD® through the alternatives menu
Under the constituent category several child alternatives can be created to correlate with 
however many scenarios are to be performed for analysis. Double clicking on one of the 
Figure 5: Alternatives Menu for Applying Constituent
system. Therefore, this default value will have a 
 
 
cations therefore depend on 
 (Figure 5).  
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created constituent child alternatives will open the alternative properties flex tables 
shown in figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Applying Constituent to Alternative 1 
Here the constituent can be selected via a drop down menu. If the constituent has not 
been created, one can be input by clicking on the ellipsis button to the right of the drop 
down menu. Now that WaterCAD® has a constituent selected, it can be applied to a 
location in the system for release. Using the tabs shown in Figure 6, the component of the 
system where the contaminant is to be released can be selected. For the purpose of this 
study, the contaminant was released in the tanks. However, because the tanks were 
modeled as reservoirs, the input for the contaminant release is in the reservoir tab. Within 
the reservoir tabs are the various options for contaminant release types. A flow paced 
booster was selected, along with inputting the concentration amount, initial concentration 
and mass flow rate values.  
A constituent pattern was also created to model the release time for each scenario. 
This was done using an hourly pattern which coincided with the tank boosting schedules 
for each scenario. Since release only requires a duration of one hour to completely release 
the contaminant concentration, a pattern was created to release the contaminant for one 
hour starting at the time at which the tank is active. An example is shown in figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Constituent Pattern for Tanks 1-4 and 6 
 
This pattern will allow the constituent to release for one hour duration at the specified 
mass flow rate and location.  
6.4 Analysis Simulation 
Once the scenarios, constituent properties and release locations have been input 
into WaterCAD®, the constituent simulation is ready to be performed. The simulation is 
set up to an extended period simulation (EPS), with the correct duration and desired time 
steps within the calculation options menu. The analysis type must also be switched from 
a hydraulics analysis to a constituent analysis in order for the concentrations to be 
recorded. Then, the scenarios can be run through the batch feature in the scenarios editor. 
The resulting concentration values of the contaminant spread can then be viewed in the 
flex tables.  This may require the user to add a “concentration (calculated)” data column 
in the flex tables using the edit table feature in order to view the results. 
 A better way to view the results in a holistic manner is through the incorporation 
of color coding within WaterCAD®. The “Concentration (Calculated)” field can be 
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selected as well as various color thresholds for varying concentration values. A before 
and after screen shot of the color coding effects is shown in Figure 8 below. Figure 8 
shows the spread of the contaminant in the system after one hour of contamination. Green 
pipelines indicate that there is no contaminant within the pipeline. Red pipelines indicate 
a concentration greater than 250,000mg/L within the pipeline. This provides a qualitative 
view of the overall spread of the contamination event and its severity for each hour of 
simulation.  The simulation hour can be changed using the time browser in WaterCAD®, 
yielding an updated contamination spread with color coding as well.  
 
Figure 8: Movement of a contaminant through a distribution system 
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CHAPTER VII: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
7.1 Exporting WaterCAD® Results to Excel 
WaterCAD® has a feature to export a flex table’s data set into various formats 
including a compatible excel format. First the results of the flex tables were modified to 
include only concentration data for the Junctions. The junction flex table was selected 
and filtered using the edit button at the top of the table. All categories from the right hand 
table except for the label and concentration (calculated) categories were removed in order 
to limit the data, and file size, that the export would include. The file was exported by 
using the report drop-down arrow at the top of the flex table and selecting the option to 
report all time steps. After creating the report, the file was converted into an excel format 
through the export feature of the report. The newly created excel file was named 
appropriately for ease of tracking data for each scenario and the process was repeated for 
each scenario that has been created in WaterCAD®. 
With the current V8i version of WaterCAD®, the export feature, although 
functional, does not yield a data set that is clean and easily configurable to application in 
Excel. To counteract the formatting that WaterCAD® exports, a macro was developed in 
excel in order to open the raw WaterCAD® file to convert and relocate the contamination 
data into a more useful form. The macro was developed by first reorganizing and 
reformatting the data of one WaterCAD® export file by hand, while recording the 
keystrokes and commands via the macro record feature in Excel.  The partial chart in 
Table 9 illustrates the format that is desired where the various nodes are in the first 
column with their corresponding concentration readings at the various time steps. 
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Table 9: Desired Format after converting WaterCAD® output via Excel Macro 
NODE 
Time Step (hours) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
BP-90_ND 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BP-90_NU 0 0 0 0 0 0 
J3000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
J3005 0 0 0 0 0 0 
J3010 0 0 0 0 0 0 
J3015 0 0 0 0 0 0 
J3020 0 0 0 0 0 0 
J3025 0 0 0 0 0 0 
J3030 0 0 0 0 0 0 
J3035 0 0 0 0 0 0 
J3040 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The macro was applied to a button, which can be found in the developer tab in 
Excel, for quick use when the other WaterCAD® files were imported for adjustment. 
Another issue that was encountered from the WaterCAD® formatting was that the data 
was formatted as text instead of as a number. This will pose problems if any of the data is 
used in formulas which require numerical values, and can potentially give invalid results. 
These were reformatted as numerical values within excel to mitigate the potential 
formulaic errors due to numbers stored as text. 
7.2 Data Processing in Excel 
Now that the data is organized by the macro that was outlined above, it can be 
processed using the COUNTIF function in excel. COUNTIF will count a specified cell 
based on the criteria specified. The specified criteria will depend on the minimum 
thresholds that a sensor can read. The minimum concentration threshold can be taken as 
1.0 mg/L (USEPA 2009a). Therefore, the COUNTIF should be set as follows: COUNTIF 
(CELLRANGE, “>1”) 
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The cell range is the row of concentration values for a particular node. The quotation 
marks surrounding the specified requirement should be noted. If these quotations are 
omitted, then the equation will result in an error. A partial example of the COUNTIF 
summary tables is given in Table 10. This should be done for each injection point. Since 
the injection points for this research were the tanks, each tank has a COUNTIF summary 
table like the one below (Table 10). 
Table 10: COUNTIF Summary Table (Partial) 
Tank 1 
NODE Count 
J3780 17 
J3810 16 
J3745 14 
J5740 14 
J5735 13 
J3535 12 
J3670 12 
J3735 12 
J3740 12 
J3765 12 
 
7.3 Data Sorting 
Once the COUNTIF summary tables have been completed for each of the injection 
nodes, they can then be sorted to display the node with the highest frequency of 
contamination counts. This is accomplished by first highlighting both the NODE column 
and the COUNT column. Then under the DATA tab in the excel ribbon there is a button 
labeled SORT. A message in excel will then require the user to select how to sort the 
data. Depending on the organization of the data, the selection may differ than in this 
study. In the COLUMN input, the COUNTIF values were selected as the primary column 
to sort. In the SORT ON input, the default selection of VALUES was left as the chosen 
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input. Finally for the ORDER input, the LARGEST TO SMALLEST option was chosen. 
The data is now sorted with the node having the highest number of contamination counts 
at the top of the summary table. The various tables can now be combined based on the 
desired scenarios in order to obtain the nodes with the highest efficiency for each 
scenario. The results of the analysis are shown visually through pipe and node network 
maps in Appendix A. These maps are provided for each scenario and the nodes are 
highlighted that detected the highest number of contaminant concentrations over a twenty 
four hour period. This time period fluctuates based on which tank is used to distribute the 
contaminant. This fluctuation is due to the varied tank pumping schedules previously 
referred to in Chapter 5.  
7.4 Discussion of Results 
All of the following graphics are color coded depicting the nodes with the highest 
number of contamination detections in the analysis. Therefore, all graphics in chapter 7 
will follow the general legend shown in figure 9. This indicates that nodes color coded 
red detected a contaminant more times than any other node in the system during the 24 
hour duration. Nodes with colors other than red identified in figure 9, had fewer of 
contamination detections over the same duration, but were still significant as compared to 
the vast majority of nodes in the system. Nodes which do not have color coding either did 
not detect a contamination during the analysis or were deemed to be below the threshold 
for significant contamination counts. The number of color coded nodes depended on the 
scenario. Enough nodes were color coded to show the significant zones in the system 
where optimal nodes could be located. Larger views of all scenarios are located in 
Appendix A. 
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Figure 9: Frequency of detected contaminations above the minimum threshold at a 
particular node 
 
7.4.1 All Tanks Active Scenario (Scenario 4) 
What became apparent from the results is that there seemed to be three zones in 
the system where nodes were frequently seen as having a high amount of detections. This 
includes a series of pipe loops near the center of the model and a longer stretch of 
pipeline on the northeastern portion of the model and shown in Figure 10.  
 
 
Figure 10: High Priority Zones for the CITY to implement Monitoring 
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7.4.2 Tank Combinations Based on Boost Schedule (Scenario 3) 
The scenarios outlined in this section are most indicative of a contamination event 
because the scenarios combine the tanks which operate on the same schedules based on 
the pumping schedules. This would assume that each tank in the pairing is contaminated 
with the constituent and would be indicative of a case where terrorist compromise all 
tanks in the system. In this case, when the various tank pairings became active, it would 
be expected to see the results shown here. 
7.4.2.1 Tanks 1 and 3 
According to the pumping schedule used to calibrate the model, tanks 1 and 3 
operate on the same schedule. They are active on Thursdays and Sundays starting at 
5:00AM. Figure 11 illustrates the results were clustered around two sections of the 
system. 
 
Figure 11: Optimal Sensor Points for Tanks 1 and 3 combined (Full 
Concentration) 
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Comparing figure 11 to figure 12, we can see that the change in concentration of the 
contaminant did not have a significant impact on the optimal node locations. In both 
scenarios, the two zones of high detection counts were the same, with only a slight 
variability in the particular nodes color coding assignments. 
 
 
Figure 12: Optimal Sensor Points for Tanks 1 and 3 combined (Half 
Concentration) 
 
7.4.2.2 Tanks 2 and 4 
Tanks 2 and 4 operate on the same schedule and are active on Tuesdays and 
Saturdays starting at 5:00AM. Figure 13 shows the zones of significance during a full 
concentration scenario. It is important to note that the effect of tank 4 is not seen in 
figures 13 and 14, as the spread from tank 4 is well contained in the northeast part of the 
system and is expelled quickly through user outflows. The concentration change also did 
not have a substantial effect on the optimal sensor locations, as both figures 13 and 14 
demonstrate that roughly the same locations were obtained in both scenarios. 
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Figure 13: Optimal Sensor Points for Tanks 2 and 4 combined (Full 
Concentration) 
 
 
Figure 14: Optimal Sensor Points for Tanks 2 and 4 combined (Half 
Concentration) 
 
7.4.2.3 Tanks 5, 6 and 7 
Tanks 5, 6 and 7 operate on the same schedule and are active on Mondays, 
Wednesdays and Fridays. Each tank has an individual start time with Tank 5 starting at 
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4:00AM, tank 6 starting at 5:00AM and tank 7 starting at 4:00PM. 
 
Figure 15: Optimal Sensor Points for Tanks 5, 6 and 7 combined (Full 
Concentration) 
 
As we can see in figure 15, there were two main zones where the optimal nodes 
were concentrated. One zone simply contained the node which had the highest number of 
contamination counts where the other zone contained an abundance of nodes with lesser 
counts. One of the reasons for this spread of optimal nodes through the two zones is due 
to the nature of the main line in which a majority of the optimal nodes are located. This is 
a primary means where water is transported on the east side of the city. Therefore, if the 
contaminant were to move in that direction, then a majority of those nodes would be 
expected to have high detection counts.  
We can also see that, as with the previous scenarios, the decreased concentration 
input did not have a significant effect on the placement of the optimal nodes. The 
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concentration change did affect was the location of the node with the highest priority in 
some instances, while the zones of significance remained unchanged. 
 
Figure 16: Optimal Sensor Points for Tanks 5, 6 and 7 combined (Half 
Concentration) 
 
7.4.3 Individual Tanks (Scenarios 1 and 2) 
Appendix B shows zones of significance for each individual tank scenario. These 
scenarios by themselves could be indicative of real world expectations if terrorists only 
contaminate one of the tanks in the system.  This will also show which tanks have the 
most effect on the system. 
7.5 Summary of Results 
As we can see from the results, the change in the injection concentration amount 
did not have a significant effect on the optimal sensor locations. The effect, if any, was 
that for a few scenarios the optimal node would change depending on the decrease in 
injection concentration. The new optimal node would come from the same pool of 
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efficient nodes. In other words, the zones where the clusters of nodes were identified did 
not change in any scenario when the injection concentration was halved. Figure 10 is the 
most telling of the overall results as it shows the three zones of significance which 
contained optimal sensor locations in a majority of the contamination scenarios. Of the 
twenty two scenarios, only four had a majority of their optimal sensor locations outside 
of the zones of significance shown in Figure 10. These were: 
• Tank 4 (Full Concentration) 
• Tank 4 (Half Concentration) 
• Tank 7 (Full Concentration) 
• Tank 7 (Half Concentration) 
The potential reasons for these deviations are as follows: For the two Tank 4 
scenarios, the reason the optimal sensor points deviate is because the extent of the Tank 
4’s influence on the system is relatively small. Note from figures 31 and 32 in Appendix 
A, that the extent of the Tank 4 contamination is isolated in the northeast corner of the 
distribution system. The reason for this isolation is due to the hydraulics of the system as 
well as the outflow from users of the system.  
Tank 7’s range of influence on the system is similar and tends to remain along the 
western portion of the CITY. Shown in Figures 37 and 38, the spread of the contaminant 
remains on western and southwestern portions of the distribution system. This is due to 
the configuration of the distribution system and is highly influenced by the major 
highway which runs northwest through the center of the system. This effectively isolates 
the western and eastern portions of the distribution from each other. More importantly, 
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the hydraulics of the system also isolates the spread of the contaminant by containing it in 
the western portion of the system. This phenomenon occurs in all scenarios, but seems 
more prominent for the Tank 4 and Tank 7 scenarios.  
7.6 Recommendations 
A single optimal point for the system is not feasible to identify because of the vast 
amount of variables involved. However, the zones of significance which are outlined for 
each scenario dictate the cluster of optimal nodes which would provide robust coverage 
of the system in regards to monitoring. Figures 10-16 and 39-52, should therefore be used 
as guides for the optimal placement of sensors in the WDS. As previously identified, the 
quantity of sensors will ultimately drive the location of placement. This will depend on 
the economic feasibility of using multiple monitoring sensors.
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CHAPTER VIII: FUTURE STEPS 
Although the given model was calibrated for the hydraulics of the system by 
changing the fixed grade elevations of the tanks, a calibration could also be performed for 
the constituent transport. Chlorine residuals taken at the end points of the water 
distribution system could be compared to the constituent transport model using chlorine 
as the “contaminant”. This would confirm or dispute the contamination transport model 
that is being used to predict the optimal sensor point locations for all scenarios. This 
would involve correctly inputting the properties of the chlorine residual into the 
constituent properties manager and should include bulk reaction rates, wall reaction rates, 
as well as the diffusivity coefficient and initial concentration of the residual. Once the 
scenario is run for the chlorine residual, it could then be compared to actual chlorine 
residual data gathered from end-point testing. 
Other forms of distribution vulnerability should also be explored to fully address 
the likely consequences of other potential forms of terrorist activity. One such analysis 
could be a pipe break scenario in order to determine the critical pipes in the distribution 
system. These types of analyses should explore the other vulnerabilities of the system in 
order to gleam insight into the possible outcomes if contamination is not the primary 
intent. This is where the accessibility of the various hydraulic structures will be crucial in 
identifying the points where physical damage has the highest likelihood of occurring. 
Treatment plants and major pumping structures are of concern (Deininger et al. (2000). 
Electrical structures are also of high importance due to the fact that their interruption 
could cause various failures and disruptions in water delivery of most distribution 
systems. Reserve generators then become a secondary target of importance for the same 
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reasons as the primary electrical structures. These analyses could also be expanded to 
disruptions and damage caused by natural phenomena such as earthquake, lightening, or 
flooding. 
Other contaminant forms should also be explored in future research. 
Cryptosporidium was selected in this study in order to choose a conservative constituent. 
However, it is evident that there are numerous other contaminants which are much more 
dangerous than Cryptosporidium. The only caveat is that most of these dangerous 
contaminants, having low LD50 values, are not resistant to chlorine. Research should be 
implemented in determining other contaminants which could be weaponized to behave 
similarly to Cryptosporidium but have a much lower LD50 value, corresponding to a 
greater risk to the system. This sort of information should have implemented protection 
from being distributed to the general public as it could be used against the system for 
which it is researched to protect. This is similar to Botulinus cultures, which when 
requested by unauthorized individuals, prompt federal authorities to follow up and 
monitor the use of such cultures.  
Another facet of additional contamination research should include identifying 
properties of various constituents within pressurized water lines. Identifying properties 
such as diffusivity and improved decay rates would be highly advantages in modeling 
approaches. A majority of the research into contaminant properties focuses on 
contaminant movement through groundwater. This would vary dramatically from 
pressurized pipeline and should be explored to better understand how various constituents 
behave and react to the turbulent, pressurized nature of distribution lines.  
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For the zones of significance identified in this study, further exploration of the 
node importance should be undertaken to gauge which nodes would serve as the ideal 
location for sensors. The importance of a node can fluctuate based on the outflow use. 
Nodes whose outflow use is primarily for irrigation use would be secondary in priority to 
nodes whose outflow was directly connected to human consumption, especially for 
important facilities such as hospitals. Studies should be undertaken to categorize the 
nodes within the zones of significance to better optimize the sensor placements. 
As Chastain (2004) describes, the method itself should also be considered and 
modified for improvement. The primary basis for location in this method is through the 
time since injection value. However, a more prudent variable to consider would be the 
volume that a particular node consumes during analysis. This would improve the method 
to account more directly for adverse health impacts. 
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APPENDIX A: VISUAL RESULTS FOR EACH SCENARIO 
 
Figure 17: Optimal Sensor Points for All Tanks (Full Concentration) 
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Figure 18: Optimal Sensor Points for All Tanks (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 19: Optimal Sensor Points for Tanks 1 and 3 (Full Concentration) 
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Figure 20: Optimal Sensor Points for Tanks 1 and 3 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 21: Optimal Sensor Points for Tanks 2 and 4 (Full Concentration) 
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Figure 22: Optimal Sensor Points for Tanks 2 and 4 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 23: Optimal Sensor Points for Tanks 5, 6, and7 (Full Concentration) 
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Figure 24: Optimal Sensor Points for Tanks 5, 6, and 7 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 25: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 1 (Full Concentration) 
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Figure 26: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 1 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 27: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 2 (Full Concentration) 
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Figure 28: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 2 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 29: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 3 (Full Concentration) 
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Figure 30: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 3 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 31: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 4 (Full Concentration) 
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Figure 32: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 4 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 33: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 5 (Full Concentration) 
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Figure 34: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 5 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 35: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 6 (Full Concentration) 
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Figure 36: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 6 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 37: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 7 (Full Concentration) 
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Figure 38: Optimal Sensor Points for Tank 7 (Half Concentration) 
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APPENDIX B: ZONES OF SIGNIFICANCE 
  
Figure 39: Zones of Significance for Tank 1 (Full Concentration) 
 
  
Figure 40: Zones of Significance for Tank 1 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 41: Zones of Significance for Tank 2 (Full Concentration) 
 
  
Figure 42: Zones of Significance for Tank 2 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 43: Zones of Significance for Tank 3 (Full Concentration) 
 
  
Figure 44: Zones of Significance for Tank 3 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 45: Zones of Significance for Tank 4 (Full Concentration) 
 
  
Figure 46: Zones of Significance for Tank 4 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 47: Zones of Significance for Tank 5 (Full Concentration) 
 
  
Figure 48: Zones of Significance for Tank 5 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 49: Zones of Significance for Tank 6 (Full Concentration) 
 
  
Figure 50: Zones of Significance for Tank 6 (Half Concentration) 
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Figure 51: Zones of Significance for Tank 7 (Full Concentration) 
 
  
Figure 52: Zones of Significance for Tank 7 (Half Concentration) 
 
 
